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ABSTRACT 
Lorien Stice-Lawrence: Too Small to Regulate: International Evidence on Regulatory 
Monitoring 
(Under the direction of Mark Lang) 
 
I examine a phenomenon called Too Small to Regulate (TSTR) by which industries 
composed predominantly of small firms are more likely to violate regulatory requirements 
because their industry composition makes them especially difficult to effectively monitor. I 
identify TSTR industries throughout the world and find evidence consistent with firms in these 
industries receiving less regulatory monitoring using measures derived from firms’ financial 
disclosures and downloads of EDGAR filings by SEC and IRS employees. Consistent with 
inadequate oversight, firms in TSTR industries are penalized by the market with lower liquidity 
and are more likely to engage in non-compliant activities such as tax avoidance. The 
consequences of TSTR appear to be less severe when firms are monitored by third parties such 
as financial analysts, institutional investors, the news media, or Big N auditors. The TSTR effect 
varies predictably with exogenous changes in regulatory monitoring, enforcement, and resource 
constraints and is amplified in industries where regulation plays a greater role. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In this paper I use an international setting to identify variation in the amount of regulatory 
monitoring and deterrence that firms face. Motivated by a recent World Bank policy paper which 
theoretically demonstrates the difficulty regulators face in deterring non-compliant behavior 
when firms in an industry are small (Basu and Dixit, 2014) as well as evidence documenting the 
spillover effects of regulatory monitoring for industry peers (Block and Feinstein, 1986; Gande 
and Lewis, 2009; Gleason et al., 2008; Schenk, 2012), I examine how the size distribution of 
firms in an industry affects the ability of regulators to effectively monitor and deter non-
compliance. I find that firms in industries composed predominately of small firms receive 
disproportionately less regulatory monitoring and are more likely to engage in non-compliant 
activities, as manifested through tax avoidance and market liquidity. This phenomenon, termed 
Too Small to Regulate (or TSTR) by Basu and Dixit (2014), has important implications for 
regulators who must optimally choose which firms to monitor, as well as investors and other 
stakeholders who rely on regulators to ensure compliance. 
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, a large amount of attention has been devoted to 
the Too Big to Fail problem. Policy-makers have proposed many potential solutions, including 
limiting the size of firms to prevent them from becoming systemically important (IMF, 2014). In 
response to proposals such as this, Basu and Dixit (2014) developed a theoretical model in order 
to demonstrate that this solution is not without costs because industries composed of small firms 
also pose their own regulatory challenge: they are disproportionately costly to monitor. This is 
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because resource-constrained regulators cannot perfectly monitor all firms, and smaller firms 
face smaller maximum penalties because of limited liability. This Too Small to Regulate 
problem generalizes to a wide variety of regulatory settings.
1 
In addition, empirical evidence 
documents that regulatory monitoring of individual firms has spillover effects on other firms 
within the same industry by directing attention to and deterring potential non-compliance of 
peers (Block and Feinstein, 1986; Gande and Lewis, 2009; Schenck, 2012). This is because 
monitoring any individual firm provides information about and decreases the cost of monitoring 
its peers. Further, small firms are individually subject to less regulatory monitoring in the first 
place (Hoopes et al, 2012). These forces further compound the initial problem identified by Basu 
and Dixit (2014) because when a firm’s peers are small, these peers are subject to less regulatory 
monitoring at any given time and thus generate fewer regulatory spillovers. As a result of the 
theoretical forces predicted by Basu and Dixit (2014) as well as the spillover effects documented 
in the empirical literature, firms in industries composed predominantly of small firms are likely 
to face less regulatory monitoring and engage in more non-compliant behaviors. 
In my empirical analyses, I provide what is, to my knowledge, the first empirical 
evidence on the effect of industry structure on financial regulators. In particular, I identify TSTR 
country-industry-years as those where the median firm is small (in the bottom size quintile) 
relative to other firms in the same year and find that firms in TSTR industries are subject to less 
oversight by regulators, even when controlling for firm and industry size and commonly used 
industry concentration measures as well as industry and firm fixed effects. I indirectly measure 
regulatory monitoring for firms in many countries by counting regulatory monitoring-related 
                                                          
1
 I use the phrase “Too Small to Regulate” to be consistent with Basu and Dixit (2014) but acknowledge that their 
story and my tests focus on monitoring by regulators and not the regulations that they are enforcing. Thus, this 
phenomenon might also be called “Too Small to Monitor,” although the issues that drive this problem are specific to 
regulators and not other types of monitors, in particular because of the nature of their resource constraints. 
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keywords in their corporate annual reports. Additionally, for U.S. firms I directly measure one 
type of regulatory monitoring by tracking the extent to which employees at the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) access firms’ publicly 
available financial disclosures via the SEC’s EDGAR database. Both measures indicate that 
firms in TSTR industries face less regulatory monitoring. 
 Further, I find evidence suggesting that firms in TSTR industries are more likely to 
engage in non-compliant behavior. I choose two measures of non-compliance that are observable 
even when firms are subject to less regulatory monitoring: tax avoidance, measured with 
effective tax rates, and stock liquidity. Firms in TSTR industries have lower effective tax rates, 
consistent with them engaging in more tax avoidance activities than they would if they were 
subject to greater monitoring by regulators. In addition, they experience significant stock 
liquidity penalties, consistent with market participants facing a greater information disadvantage 
relative to informed traders, facing greater uncertainty about the level of firms’ compliance, or in 
some cases directly observing non-compliant activities. 
Prior research demonstrates that other market monitors can act as substitutes for more 
formal regulatory monitoring (Dyck et al., 2008; Miller, 2006). Similarly, I find that firms in 
TSTR industries that have greater media coverage, financial analyst following, ownership by 
large institutional investors (e.g., mutual funds), and those which have a Big N auditor are less 
affected by TSTR. To the extent to which other market mechanisms can complement regulatory 
efforts, this can help resource-constrained regulators more efficiently deter non-compliance. 
Lastly, I further validate the mechanism by which the TSTR phenomenon occurs by 
documenting predictable variation in the TSTR effect around exogenous events and across 
countries, industries, and time. Firms in TSTR industries experience disproportionately large 
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increases in monitoring after the advent of SOX 408 which mandates periodic filing reviews of 
all firms, and the effect of TSTR on liquidity decreases after the initial enforcement of insider 
trading laws. Further, the TSTR effect is amplified during recessions when regulators are 
particularly resource-constrained and in industry sectors where regulation is more important. 
Most of the results in this paper use a cross-country setting to test predictions in many 
economies throughout the world. A cross-country study is ideal because it allows me to compare 
outcomes between TSTR and non-TSTR industries while controlling for the type of industry in 
which firms operate. This ensures that the outcomes that I document are attributable to a TSTR 
industry configuration and not innate differences across industries. An international setting also 
allows testing of this effect in a variety of regulatory environments, with the TSTR phenomenon 
occurring in both high and low enforcement countries. 
My results regarding the Too Small to Regulate phenomenon have both practical and 
academic significance. First, whereas the prior academic literature has focused mainly on firm-
level determinants of regulatory monitoring (Johnston and Petacchi, 2015), I demonstrate that the 
size distribution of firms within an industry also plays an important role in determining how 
much regulatory monitoring a firm receives. More importantly, this is a relevant issue to 
regulators who must optimally choose which firms to monitor and has implications for investors, 
consumers, creditors, and employees who benefit from regulation and rely on regulators to 
ensure compliance. Although my study focuses on financial outcomes (e.g., tax avoidance) that 
are easily measured and compared across firms from many different industries, this regulatory 
problem could extend to other outcomes that have real “human” impacts, for example health 
outcomes associated with food quality and employee safety regulations.  
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 My study is also important because the results indicate that regulators may want to 
allocate their scarce resources to monitoring firms that do not have the benefit of other informal 
monitors in order to ensure the most efficient use of these resources in terms of promoting 
compliance. To the extent to which other market mechanisms can complement regulatory efforts, 
it is possible to reduce some of the negative consequences of TSTR. 
 Finally, my tests within the U.S. are among the first to directly measure regulatory 
monitoring activities, a construct which is notoriously difficult to capture, as opposed to more 
indirect measures using budgets or enforcement outcomes (Bozanic et al., 2016; Coffee, 2007; 
Jackson and Roe, 2009). I document determinants of SEC and IRS monitoring and show that 
SOX 408 led to fundamental shifts in the way that the SEC allocated monitoring across firms. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
While the benefits of any particular regulation are often context specific and depend on 
its relative costs and benefits (Arrow et al., 1995; Becker, 1968; Zingales, 2009), prior research 
has generally shown that greater regulatory enforcement and monitoring is beneficial.
2
 However, 
there is very little evidence on the effects of within-country variation in regulatory monitoring 
(Bushee and Leuz, 2005; Christensen et al., 2016), and even less about drivers of this variation 
(Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). This paper adds insight into this literature by investigating 
determinants and compliance outcomes of regulatory monitoring, with the caveat that my results 
are silent on the net costs of monitoring or the benefits of any specific regulation. 
The hypotheses in my paper are based on the model from Basu and Dixit (2014) as well 
as a related literature on the spillover effects of enforcement. First, the Basu and Dixit (2014) 
model demonstrates that as the size of individual firms within an industry decreases (holding the 
total size of the industry constant) the total amount of regulatory monitoring required to ensure 
compliance for the industry as a whole increases. This is because the limited liability nature of 
corporations means that smaller firms essentially have less to lose because only corporate (not 
personal) assets are at stake when firms are penalized by regulators. As a result, smaller firms 
require a larger probability of detection in order to be successfully deterred from non-
compliance. On the other hand, although only a few segments or branches in a large firm may be 
found violating regulations, regulators can impose a much larger penalty by fining the 
                                                          
2
 Barth and Israeli (2013); Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002); Christensen et al. (2013); Christensen et al. (2016); 
Jackson and Roe (2009). 
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corporation as a whole.
3
 Thus managers of larger firms have incentives to monitor activities 
within the firm to ensure the entire firm is not penalized for non-compliance of a few segments, 
and regulators are essentially able to transfer some of the costs of monitoring to firms 
themselves. Because of these forces, Basu and Dixit’s model predicts that it is disproportionately 
costly to monitor industries composed of small firms, or Too Small to Regulate (TSTR) 
industries. Additionally, Basu and Dixit (2014) point out that this effect should also occur when 
some per-firm costs of monitoring are fixed (Dharmapala et al., 2011). The findings in Basu and 
Dixit (2014) imply that for a set amount of monitoring resources the probability that any 
individual firm in a TSTR industry is monitored is smaller because its peers consume a greater 
amount of regulatory resources.
4
 
 Additionally, related findings from the empirical literature suggest that other factors may 
exacerbate the compliance problem that Basu and Dixit (2014) predict. As described below, 
regulators are disproportionately less likely to monitor firms in TSTR industries because of a 
lack of regulatory spillover from their (small) industry peers. 
First, while regulators must satisfy a number of political, policy, and social objectives, 
they are also sensitive to the relative monetary costs and benefits of any given investigation. For 
example, anecdotal evidence indicates that the SEC is less likely to investigate companies when 
they expect the cost of the investigation to outweigh the value in terms of fines or investor 
benefits (Stewart, 2011). As a result, the limits on expected penalties and disproportionate costs 
to monitor small firms which drive the Too Small to Regulate problem described by Basu and 
                                                          
3
 For example, consider the case of Wells Fargo, which was fined $224 million dollars in September 2016 by 
multiple U.S. government agencies for fraudulent business practices (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wells-fargo-
carloans-idUSKCN11Z2MN). Fines of this magnitude are simply not practical for most of the firms that I study 
because this amount exceeds the market value of more than half of the firms in my sample. 
 
4
 Although no model can or is intended to capture all aspects that are present empirically, many of Basu and Dixit’s 
assumptions are supported in the existing empirical literature. See Shavell (1984) on limited liability and Kedia and 
Rajgopal (2011) and Blackburne (2014) on regulatory resource constraints. 
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Dixit (2014) may in turn lead regulators seeking to maximize their expected payoff to monitor 
small firms less often in the first place. This is consistent with evidence such as Hoopes et al. 
(2012) which shows that the IRS is less likely to audit small firms. 
These effects are likely to be amplified at the industry-level by the presence of regulatory 
spillover effects documented in prior studies which show that enforcement actions targeted at a 
single firm within an industry can lead to increased regulatory monitoring, capital market 
penalties, and deterrence of misbehavior for industry peers (Gande and Lewis, 2009; Gleason et 
al. 2008; Jennings et al. 2011; Schenck 2012). This is because monitoring one firm in an industry 
provides information about its industry peers and decreases the costs of monitoring those peers 
(Block and Feinstein, 1986). Firms in TSTR industries are much less likely to face spillover 
effects from their peers in the form of heightened regulatory monitoring or deterrence because 
their TSTR peers are unlikely to be singled out by regulators and thus unlikely to direct 
regulatory attention to other firms in the same industry. Further, prior research has shown that 
even when small firms are monitored by regulators, they are less likely to create spillovers for 
their peers, further compounding this result (Gleason et al., 2008). 
Combined, these forces suggest that firms in Too Small to Regulate industries are not 
only more difficult to deter from non-compliance, but they also operate in an environment that is 
subject to unusually little oversight because firms are individually unlikely to be monitored and 
are also unlikely to be subject to regulatory monitoring as a result of spillover effects from their 
peers.
5
 This leads to my first hypothesis: 
                                                          
5
 Essentially this relaxes two assumptions in Basu and Dixit (2014): first that all firms are equally likely to be 
monitored, and second that the total amount of monitoring resources for the industry as a whole is exogenously 
determined (i.e., not affected by industry composition). This second assumption is more likely to be the case for 
regulators whose monitoring role is industry-specific; for example, mine safety inspectors will not inspect 
restaurants. However, some regulators, such as securities regulators, have jurisdiction over multiple industries, and 
can choose how they wish to allocate resources across industries. 
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H1: Firms in TSTR industries are subject to less regulatory monitoring. 
While my prediction in H1 is intuitive, there are many reasons why it might not be borne 
out in the data. For example, some critics argue that regulators spend a disproportionate amount 
of resources policing small companies while misbehavior from larger corporations goes 
unchecked (Burns, 2003; Taibbi, 2012). Industries composed of large firms may also have 
greater political influence and could be subject to less monitoring because of regulatory capture 
(Blackburne, 2014). Thus it is an empirical question whether this phenomenon exists. 
Next, if firms in TSTR industries face lower expected costs of non-compliance, as 
predicted by Basu and Dixit (2014), and less monitoring as predicted in H1, then they will be 
more likely to engage in non-compliant activities. While firms in TSTR industries are likely to 
engage in a wide variety of non-compliant activities, I focus on those which are empirically 
observable even when regulatory monitoring is low (Wang, 2013). This requirement is especially 
important in my setting because I predict that firms in TSTR industries are subject to an 
unusually low amount of regulatory monitoring, making measurement error in measures of non-
compliance that rely on regulatory detection especially severe. Given this requirement, I choose 
to focus on two measures of non-compliance: tax avoidance and liquidity.
6
 
First, tax avoidance is one type of non-compliant activity explicitly suggested by Basu 
and Dixit (2014). I use firms’ effective tax rates as a proxy for tax avoidance in this setting, 
which are easily observable because firms report their yearly tax expense in their financial 
statements. Effective tax rates can pick up both legal tax avoidance and tax aggressiveness; 
                                                          
6
 Non-compliant activities could include financial fraud, asymmetric disclosure of material information to a subset 
of investors and insider trading, inadequate internal controls, company-sanctioned use of bribes, or non-compliance 
with a variety of non-financial regulations such as health and safety requirements for both employees and 
consumers. These types of activities are difficult to directly observe, especially for a large cross-country sample 
where this type of data is not widely available. Additionally, differences across countries in regulators’ definition of 
and response to non-compliant activities make it difficult to directly compare reported occurrences of non-
compliance even when the data are available (Jackson and Roe, 2009). 
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conceptually I am interested in measuring all types of questionable behavior that would be 
curbed by more intense regulatory monitoring, including those that might be technically legal. 
Thus effective tax rates are an appropriate outcome to measure. My next hypothesis is thus:  
H2: Firms in TSTR industries are more likely to engage in tax avoidance.
7
 
Additionally, market liquidity constitutes an indirect outcome of regulatory compliance 
that is easily observable and comparable across countries, where firms that are more compliant 
with rules and regulations should have greater liquidity. This is consistent with Bushee and Leuz 
(2005) and Christensen, Hail, and Leuz (2013 and 2016) which document increases in liquidity 
for firms who experience increases in the quality of securities and disclosure regulations, and, 
most importantly, increases in the amount and intensity of regulatory monitoring and 
enforcement. To the extent that market participants are subject to a greater information 
disadvantage relative to informed traders (for example because of insider trading), face greater 
uncertainty about the compliance of firms in TSTR industries because of a lack of regulatory 
monitoring, or observe some non-compliant activities directly, TSTR firms are expected to have 
lower stock liquidity. This prediction is reasonable; as pointed out by Christensen et al. (2016), 
one of the purposes of securities regulation in particular is to ensure greater liquidity. Although 
examining tax avoidance allows me to identify one specific mechanism for non-compliance, the 
broad nature of liquidity measures allows me to capture the aggregate effect of many different 
types of potential non-compliance, including non-compliance with non-financial regulations such 
as health and safety requirements; however, this must be caveated by the fact that liquidity has 
the potential to capture other sources of uncertainty and information asymmetry unrelated to 
                                                          
7
 While I have a clear prediction about how the size of peer firms will affect tax avoidance, I make no predictions 
about the relation between a firm’s own size and tax avoidance. This relation has been debated, with mixed results, 
in a variety of studies where a firm’s size has been used as a proxy for a variety of constructs including political 
costs and economies of scale (Dyreng et al., 2008; Mills, Nutter, Schwab, 2013; Zimmerman, 1983). 
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regulatory compliance.
8
 Lastly, liquidity has implications for the cost of capital and, like tax 
avoidance, is observable when regulatory monitoring is low. As a result: 
H3: Firms in TSTR industries have lower stock liquidity. 
H2 and H3 are not without tension. Advances in technology may have decreased the cost 
of monitoring so that firms in TSTR industries are adequately deterred from non-compliance. 
Additionally, it is possible that firms are able to make use of complicated ownership and legal 
structures in order to limit the legal liability of each subsidiary, in which case small firms would 
not face smaller maximum penalties relative to larger firms and I would not observe the TSTR 
effect. More generally, the assumptions of the Basu and Dixit (2014) model may simply not be 
representative of the real world. Lastly, there is considerable debate on the benefits of regulation; 
thus while firms in my sample might be violating tax regulations, they might actually benefit 
from higher liquidity if market participants view non-compliance as optimal. 
Although firms in TSTR industries may receive less monitoring from regulators, prior 
research shows that informal market monitors can sometimes perform a similar function as 
regulatory monitors (Dyck et al., 2008; Miller, 2006), and high quality auditors have been shown 
to exercise a stronger deterrent role (Becker et al., 1998). As a consequence, higher attention by 
these market intermediaries may mitigate non-compliance in TSTR industries. This is an 
important avenue to investigate because to the extent that other market mechanisms can 
complement regulatory efforts, this can help resource-constrained regulators more efficiently 
enforce regulations. This leads to my final hypothesis: 
                                                          
8
 In order to more clearly tie my liquidity outcomes to regulatory compliance, in later tests I link the relation 
between TSTR and liquidity with variation in regulatory enforcement and the importance of regulation to the 
industry (see Section 5 for more details). 
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H4: The effect of being in a TSTR industry (on tax avoidance, liquidity) is weaker for 
firms subject to greater monitoring by other market participants (larger analyst 
following, institutional ownership, media coverage, or a Big N auditor). 
13 
 
CHAPTER 3: DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
I obtained the main sample of accounting and market data from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream with data spanning the fiscal years 1991 to 2011 for firms in 59 countries. I/B/E/S, 
the Thomson Reuters International Mutual Fund (TIMF) database, Ravenpack, and BvD Osiris 
are used for some control and outcome variables.
9
 Additionally, some tests in this paper use 
U.S.-only databases, in particular SEC EDGAR download data and Audit Analytics; for these 
tests, accounting and market data from Compustat and CRSP are used. More detailed 
information on the databases is given in Appendix A1. 
To empirically identify country-industry-years that are most likely to be Too Small to 
Regulate, I focus on industries for which the median firm is relatively small. In order to come up 
with a measure of firm size that is interpretable and comparable across time, I form yearly 
quintile ranks of firms across all countries by end of year market capitalization (lnMVE). If the 
median firm within an industry-country-year is in the lowest yearly size quintile then that 
industry is given a value of TSTR equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. Tests for the main sample identify 
industries at the 4-digit ICB level.
10
 
As presented in Table 1 Panel A, 6% of the final sample of firm-years are classified as 
TSTR. However, as shown in Panel B there is significant variation across countries. Several 
                                                          
9
 My sample ends in 2011 because my Osiris data end in that year. 
 
10
 There must be at least 2 firms in an industry-country-year. My tests are not sensitive to particular size measures 
and cutoffs. I find similar results when I measure size using sales or total assets, when I use 3-digit ICB industries, 
when I use the mean or maximum size of firms in the industry, when the median firm in an industry is in the lowest 
tercile instead of the lowest quintile, when I have no restriction on the minimum number of observations in TSTR 
industry-country-years, or when I require TSTR industry-country-years to have at least 30 firms. 
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small countries, for example Bulgaria, Sri Lanka, and Cyprus have high proportions of firms in 
TSTR industries compared to the overall sample. Part of this is driven by the specific 
configuration of firms within industries in those countries. Additionally, some countries are 
composed of predominantly small firms because of less-developed economies. This will result in 
a large number of firms being classified into TSTR industries because a larger proportion of all 
firms in the total economy fall into the lowest overall size quintile. To the extent that a regulator 
will not allocate resources to monitoring firms if the overall size of the economy and individual 
firms are small, in particular because there are initial fixed costs of establishing regulation and 
monitoring mechanisms in the first place, then it makes sense that less-developed economies are 
more likely to suffer from the TSTR problem. Further, Panel C of Table 1 shows that TSTR 
firms are spread across many types of industries. The industry with the highest proportion of 
TSTR firms is Basic Resources (Forestry and Mining), while a very small proportion of banks 
are in TSTR industries. Historical reasons, institutional environment, and culture are all factors 
that may explain why particular industries tend to be TSTR in certain countries (for example, 
French consumers have a preference for small local stores whereas the U.S. is dominated by 
superstores), but it is important to distinguish the Too Small to Regulate story from the effects of 
previously studied drivers of regulation such as financial development or industry. Because of 
this, all specifications include country and industry or firm fixed effects, which allows me to 
control for static country-, industry-, and firm-level characteristics such as financial 
development. I also control for year fixed effects.
11,12,13
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 Untabulated results which regress TSTR on a variety of fixed effects configurations confirm that much of the 
variation in this measure is driven by country-, industry-, and time-specific factors. The R
2
 of specifications 
including country, industry, year, country-year, country-industry, or industry-year fixed effects are 14.4%, 18.9%, 
0.4%, 23.1%, 55.9%, and 24.3%, respectively. Intuitively, these factors explain a great deal of my TSTR measure, 
but it still captures variation at the country-industry-year level which is not attributable to these fixed effects groups. 
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One important caveat of my TSTR measure is that it considers only publicly-traded firms. 
Because securities market regulators are tasked mainly with regulating publicly-traded firms, my 
measure is well-suited to the task of identifying the effects of inadequate monitoring by 
securities regulators. However, the TSTR effect can arise in a number of regulatory contexts that 
involve privately held firms, for example health and safety regulations and, importantly, tax 
compliance. Thus my TSTR variable is a noisy measure of non-securities regulation in industries 
where the industry configuration of publicly-traded firms is not a good proxy for the industry 
configuration of both public and private firms, which should make it especially difficult for me 
to document significant effects on tax avoidance. 
I use a variety of control variables in my empirical tests that correspond to the dependent 
variable that each analysis attempts to explain. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 
A2. Importantly, each specification controls for several key variables. First, I control for firm 
size (lnMVE) to ensure my results are not simply picking up the fact that smaller firms are 
subject to less regulatory scrutiny, regardless of industry composition.
14
 I also control for the 
aggregate size of the entire industry (lnSumMVE).
15
 Additionally, I control for two measures of 
competition related to industry composition to ensure my TSTR measure is not picking up 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12
 Untabulated results identifying TSTR industries based on within-country-year size rankings provide similar 
though weaker results, consistent with size being an absolute and not relative construct (i.e., with respect to binding 
limited liability or whether a firm is large enough to induce regulators to expend fixed monitoring costs). 
Additionally, size rankings within country-years with very few observations are more subject to measurement error. 
 
13
 The number of firms in an industry could potentially moderate the TSTR effect, either because industries with 
many small firms are more difficult to monitor than industries with a few small firms, or because industries with 
many small firms are economically more important and a greater focus of regulators. Untabulated results interacting 
TSTR with the number of firms in the industry show inconsistent results, suggesting both forces are at play. 
 
14
 Results are consistent when instead of logged MVE I control for a firm’s percentile MVE ranking across all firms 
in that year, an indicator for whether its MVE is in the lowest yearly size quintile (similar to the TSTR measure), or 
controlling for its unlogged and squared MVE. 
 
15
 Results are consistent if I control for the total number of firms as another measure of total industry size. 
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competitive pressures that increase incentives for firms to violate regulation (Karuna et al., 
2012): the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the industry’s concentration ratio 
(CRATIO).
16
 Lastly, I control for the median age of firms in the industry (Med_Age) because 
small firms tend to be younger and firm lifecycle could affect monitoring and compliance. 
H1 predicts that TSTR industries are subject to less regulatory oversight. Oversight is 
difficult to measure because the private monitoring activities of regulators are not publicly 
available and outputs of monitoring (i.e., enforcement actions) are jointly affected by the amount 
of wrongdoing and the amount of regulatory monitoring (i.e., whether the wrongdoing is 
observed by regulators; see Coffee, 2007; Jackson and Roe, 2009). I use two different 
approaches to measure regulatory oversight, one which can be used for firms in my international 
sample, and a second measure only available for firms which file financial reports with the SEC. 
My first measurement approach indirectly measures the amount of firms’ regulatory 
monitoring by analyzing their annual reports. Wiesen and Wysocki (2015) demonstrate that 
regulation-related word counts vary predictably with the amount of regulation that firms face. 
Similarly, I analyze the English-language annual reports of firms in my sample and construct two 
measures based on how often firms mention enforcement-, compliance-, and deterrence-related 
keywords in general and how often they mention the names of specific securities regulators. 
The keywords used to form the first text-based regulatory monitoring measure, 
RegWords, were generated by compiling words likely to be used by a company to describe any 
measures the firm is taking to comply with laws and regulations (e.g., compliance); words 
describing active monitoring by regulators to ensure compliance, for example surprise 
inspections, filing reviews, or inquiries (e.g., deterrence); keywords likely to indicate penalties or 
correction imposed by regulatory monitors after the discovery of non-compliance (e.g., 
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enforcement); and phrases that refer to the names of government agencies and regulators, 
especially financial regulators. Example keywords and phrases are given in the Appendix with a 
more complete list in the Internet Appendix. RegWords is the total number of these keywords.
1718
 
This measure is empirically reasonable because firms would be unlikely to discuss regulatory 
enforcement and monitoring activities if they weren’t having these types of interactions. As a 
result, if firms in TSTR industries face less regulatory monitoring, I expect to find significantly 
lower levels of regulation-related keywords in their reports.
19
 
My second measure of text-based regulatory monitoring relates more specifically to 
securities regulation and counts the number of times firms mention specific securities regulators, 
RegulatorNames. Similar to the RegWords measure, if firms in TSTR industries have fewer 
interactions with securities regulators through regulatory monitoring, then they should be less 
likely to discuss them in their annual reports. 
The sample of annual reports used to generate these text-based monitoring measures 
spans 43 countries including the U.S. over the fiscal years 1998-2011 and was obtained from 
Bureau van Dijk’s Osiris database. Further details about the data can be found in Lang and Stice-
Lawrence (2015). One limitation of this sample is that it only includes those firms which issued 
an English language annual report. International firms with English-language annual reports tend 
to be larger, more internationalized, from English-speaking countries, and with better governance 
(Jeanjean et al., 2010; Lang and Stice-Lawrence, 2015). Because these types of firms are more 
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 All specifications including RegWords in the paper control for document length (polynomial of degree five). I find 
similar results if I scale RegWords by the total number of words in the document or if I exclude words relating to 
audit and legal (including litigation) activities which may pick up governance mechanisms unrelated to regulators. 
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 By construction, this measure broadly picks up discussions relating to various types of regulations and regulators. 
While my TSTR measure is best suited to identify the Too Small to Regulate phenomenon with respect to securities 
regulation, it is also likely to be positively correlated with whether this problem exists for other types of regulation, 
and these effects will also be picked up in my liquidity measures, as discussed later. 
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likely to be subject to scrutiny from regulators and other monitors, it should be particularly 
difficult for me to document a TSTR effect using this subsample. 
My final measures of regulatory monitoring use data on downloads of financial reports 
from the SEC’s EDGAR database by employees in two government agencies: the SEC and IRS. 
Using a method similar to Bozanic et al. (2016), I identify requests by SEC and IRS employees 
of firms’ publicly available financial information by tracking requests made by IP addresses 
allocated to these two agencies. My measures are SEC_TotalViews (IRS_TotalViews) and 
SEC_UniqueViews (IRS_UniqueViews) and are the total number of a firm’s filings (including 
repeat downloads) that were downloaded by SEC-affiliated (IRS-affiliated) IP addresses over the 
fiscal year and the total number of a firm’s filings that were downloaded by SEC IP addresses for 
the first time, respectively. My sample period spans from 2004 to 2008, because 2004 is the first 
full fiscal year for which EDGAR download data are available and because downloads by the 
SEC are no longer available from the EDGAR database beginning in 2009.
20
 
EDGAR downloads by government employees constitute a direct measure of one method 
of monitoring. For example, because the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance is tasked with 
reviewing firms’ regulatory filings and, if necessary, issuing comment letters to firms to improve 
or clarify disclosure, EDGAR downloads by SEC employees may capture document views that 
are part of formal filing reviews. Similarly, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement is charged with 
identifying and investigating cases of financial fraud and misconduct and may consult a firm’s 
publicly available filings to help in its investigation, meaning that SEC EDGAR downloads 
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 Bozanic et al. (2016) also find that SEC downloads are unavailable after 2008. This could be because the SEC has 
purposefully removed SEC-initiated downloads in more recent years from the EDGAR data that it makes available 
to researchers, or because the way that SEC employees access EDGAR has changed over my sample period so that 
SEC downloads are no longer captured in the SEC’s download logs. For example SEC employees may now be 
required to access EDGAR exclusively through internal servers, or may use third-party vendors to aggregate data 
before use. There is some evidence of the latter. For example, in 2015 the SEC entered into an agreement with 
Calcbench to use their platform that provides access to and analysis of XBRL information (Calcbench, 2015). 
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could also capture part of the regulatory task of that department.
21
 Although SEC employees can 
access EDGAR filings through an internal interface referred to as Internal EDGAR, anecdotally 
in the past many SEC employees have used the online interface out of convenience. 
Additionally, although reviewing EDGAR filings is less directly related to the monitoring role of 
the IRS, firms’ regulatory filings contain performance and tax information that is relevant to tax 
authorities, and Bozanic et al. (2016) have demonstrated that IRS employees do indeed use the 
EDGAR database, consistent with it being an additional source of information in their audits. 
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allocation of IP addresses across departments is not publicly available. However, for the purposes of this paper, it is 
not critical to identify the specific type of SEC monitoring. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Tests of H1: Regulatory Monitoring of Firms in TSTR Industries 
Table 2 reports the results of my first test of H1 using regulatory word counts for the full 
sample of international firms. If firms in TSTR industries are subject to less regulatory oversight 
and my regulatory word count measures capture regulatory monitoring, then I would expect that 
TSTR firms would have lower levels of regulatory deterrence-, compliance-, and enforcement-
related words in their annuals reports and discuss specific securities regulators less often. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, Table 2 shows significantly lower levels of RegWords and 
RegulatorNames for firms in TSTR industries, even in the presence of country, industry, and 
year fixed effects (Columns 1 and 2) and firm and year fixed effects (Columns 3 and 4). In 
general, the regulatory word count measures behave fairly predictably; for example, they are 
strongly positively associated with the total length of the annual report (Num_Words), which is 
to be expected because the amount of financial disclosure is another indication of regulatory 
compliance, and because these two measures are to some extent mechanically related 
(underscoring the importance of controlling for total length when using any word count 
measure).
22
 In addition, firms appear to have higher regulatory monitoring when they have an 
American Depositary Receipt (ADR) or are reporting a loss. Curiously, the coefficient on lnMVE 
is negative, while the relation with US_GAAP is inconsistent, even though these measures should 
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 Because of concerns about a mechanical relation between my regulatory word count measure and total length, I 
also control for Num_Words to the second through fifth powers (not tabulated). 
21 
 
generally be positively associated with regulatory monitoring. However, this is likely a result of 
collinearity with Num_Words, which prior research has shown to be strongly positively 
associated with size and accounting standards (Lang and Stice-Lawrence, 2015). When 
Num_Words and its powers are omitted, these variables are positively associated with RegWords 
and RegulatorNames.
23
 
 While the results in Table 2 are encouraging, they must be caveated by the fact that 
regulatory word count measures are likely to be noisy and subject to the concerns voiced by 
Jackson and Roe (2009) because they also capture ex post enforcement which is a joint function 
of compliance and monitoring. Because of these concerns, in Table 3 I focus on the U.S. 
subsample in order to more tightly link the TSTR phenomenon with one type of regulatory 
monitoring: EDGAR downloads by government employees. While this second measure has the 
benefit of directly capturing regulatory monitoring, this test can only be conducted within a 
single country. The main benefit of the test in Table 2 is the fact that the presence of multiple 
countries allows me to fully control for industry type while still examining industry composition. 
 The results in Table 3 Panel A support the results from my international sample and show 
that SEC employees are significantly less likely to download the filings of firms in TSTR 
industries, using 3-digit SIC code industries and controlling for both industry and year fixed 
effects and firm and year fixed effects. This is even after controlling for a variety of factors 
which have been linked to outcomes of regulatory monitoring in the past (i.e., comment letters, 
Johnston and Petacchi, 2015). These control variables behave reasonably, with firms more likely 
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 For the subset of U.S. firms in my Datastream sample to which I can link SEC EDGAR download data, I find that 
SEC_TotalViews is significantly positively associated with RegulatorNames, even after controlling for all of the 
variables in Table 2. This validates the RegulatorNames measure as a measure of securities regulator monitoring. 
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to be monitored if they are larger, are not audited by a Big N auditor, or if they have issued a 
restatement in the current or prior year.
24
 
 In Panel B of Table 3, I examine monitoring of firms in TSTR industries by IRS 
employees using 4-digit SIC industries to match the finer industry specialization of the IRS 
(Smith, 2001). These results show that firms in TSTR industries also experience significantly 
lower levels of monitoring by IRS employees. While the magnitude of the effect is smaller than 
for SEC monitoring, it is significantly negative in three of the four specifications.
25
 This smaller 
economic magnitude is consistent with IRS employees using the EDGAR database less 
frequently than SEC employees as it is less directly related to their regulatory role, as can be seen 
in the descriptive statistics of Table 1. Overall, the results of Table 3 further support my first 
hypothesis that firms in TSTR industries are subject to less regulatory monitoring. 
Although neither of my measures of regulatory monitoring are perfect, taken together, the 
results of my tests of H1 suggest that the TSTR effect leads to lower monitoring. This is true 
both when tested in a setting where industry characteristics and economic environment can be 
better controlled for and also in a setting with a more direct and precise measure of monitoring. 
Tests of H2 and H3: Non-compliance of Firms in TSTR Industries 
In order to test H2, I investigate the effects of TSTR industry membership on tax 
avoidance. I capture tax avoidance using a firm’s effective tax rate (ETR), where a lower 
effective tax rate indicates that the firm is more likely to be avoiding taxes. Following Dyreng et 
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 Results in the Internet Appendix show my SEC monitoring measures behave predictably in other settings. For 
example, firms are more likely to receive a comment letter in periods when the SEC is viewing more of their filings, 
further supporting these measures as proxies for SEC monitoring. 
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 Results are robust to controlling for a firm’s effective tax rate as in Bozanic et al. (2016). 
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al. (2008), I winsorize a firm’s ETR to be between 0 and 1.26 Consistent with H2, I expect that 
firms in TSTR industries will be more likely to engage in tax avoidance activities. 
In addition, I test H3 using three measures of liquidity calculated using Datastream 
market data: bid-ask spreads, the Amihud price impact of trade measure, and zero return days. 
Bid-ask spread is the difference between the bid and ask price divided by the average of the two 
and measures the explicit costs of trading. The Amihud liquidity measure is based on the price 
pressure measure from Amihud (2002) and is calculated as the absolute value of returns divided 
by volume. Lastly, zero return days is calculated as the percent of days during the year on which 
the stock price did not change, based on the idea that little trade is likely to have occurred when 
there is no change in price. If firms in TSTR industries suffer from a lack of regulatory oversight, 
then consistent with H3 I expect that they will engage in a variety of non-compliant activities. 
Because a lack of regulatory monitoring increases uncertainty about compliance and the amount 
of information asymmetry relative to informed traders, and because some types of non-
compliance may be directly observed by market participants, a rational market should respond by 
increasing the cost of trading in that firm’s stock, thereby decreasing liquidity. 
The results of these analyses for my full sample of countries are reported in Table 4 
Panels A and B for specifications including country, industry, and year and firm and year fixed 
effects, respectively. Both panels lend strong support to H2 and H3, with firms in TSTR 
industries reporting significantly lower tax rates and experiencing significantly lower liquidity 
relative to firms in non-TSTR industries. Thus it appears that not only are firms in TSTR 
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 I include loss firms in this regression to retain as comprehensive a sample as possible. Results are similar if 
instead I exclude loss firms. 
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industries subject to less regulatory monitoring, but they also appear to engage in non-compliant 
behaviors in response to this lack of oversight.
27
 
I provide further evidence of this regulatory non-compliance by showing that the effect of 
being in a TSTR industry varies predictably across firms. In Table 5 I examine the effect that a 
firm’s own size and amount of regulatory monitoring have on the relation between TSTR and tax 
avoidance and liquidity. In Table 5 Panel A, I reestimate the tests in Table 4 Panels A and B and 
show that the effect of TSTR on tax avoidance and liquidity is weaker for larger firms in TSTR 
industries, consistent with large firms facing larger maximum penalties and being monitored 
more frequently than small firms, even in TSTR industries. Similarly, in Panel B I show that the 
effect of TSTR on tax avoidance and liquidity is weaker for firms with higher levels of 
regulatory monitoring, RegWords, consistent with the presence of monitoring acting as a 
deterrent. These results complement the results in my previous analyses by showing that the 
effect of TSTR varies predictably with size and regulatory monitoring, further supporting my 
interpretation of the mechanism driving the results in Table 4. 
Tests of H4: Substitutes for Regulatory Monitoring 
Next I examine the effect that informal monitoring has on the consequences of TSTR. In 
my tests of H2 and H3, I demonstrate that inadequate regulatory monitoring in TSTR industries 
leads to more non-compliant behavior on the part of firms and that the market penalizes these 
firms with lower liquidity. However, Dyck et al. (2008) and Miller (2006) show that other 
market participants can serve a monitoring role. In Table 6 I interact my TSTR variables with the 
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 To further confirm my interpretation of the ETR results in Table 4 as evidence of tax avoidance, I obtain data on 
tax haven activity for a subset of my firms from the BvD Osiris database and demonstrate in the Internet Appendix 
that firms in TSTR industries have a significantly greater number of subsidiaries incorporated in tax haven countries 
(t-statistic = 5.2), consistent with these firms being more likely to engage in tax avoidance activities, in particular 
those likely to be in violation of tax regulations (see Balakrishnan et al., 2012; Desai et al, 2006; and Lisowski, 
2010, which use tax haven activity of U.S. firms as evidence of tax aggressiveness). Because these data are only 
available for a subset of firms in a single year, I rely on the ETR measure in my main analyses. 
__________________________ 
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presence of four other monitors: analysts, institutional owners, the news media, and auditors. 
Analyst following (Analyst) reflects the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts about a 
firm in a given year; institutional ownership (Inst_Own) captures the percent of a firm’s shares 
held by mutual funds; media coverage (Media_Covg) represents the number of news articles 
written about a firm in a given fiscal year; and BigN is an indicator variable for whether a firm is 
audited by a Big N auditor. All four of these market participants have been shown to exert 
monitoring and disciplinary power over firms, thus H4 predicts that the TSTR effects 
documented in Table 4 will be weaker in the presence of these monitors. The results reported in 
Table 6 are consistent with H4 and demonstrate that the effect of TSTR on tax avoidance and 
liquidity is weaker when analyst following, institutional ownership, and media coverage are 
high, and when a firm has a Big N auditor, suggesting that these monitors can mitigate the 
effects of TSTR. 
It is possible that my empirical measures for other monitors might be indirectly capturing 
regulatory monitoring if these variables tend to increase when regulatory monitoring increases. 
In that case, the results in Table 6 would not be capturing substitutes for regulatory monitoring, 
but additional indirect proxies for regulatory monitoring itself. In untabulated results I show that 
the direct effect of TSTR on analyst following, institutional ownership, and media coverage is 
generally positive, consistent with greater demand for informal monitors when regulatory 
monitoring is low. This result is inconsistent with the decreases in regulatory monitoring that I 
document using both of my regulatory measures in Tables 2 and 3, making it unlikely that these 
measures capture a regulatory construct. Further, the opposite results for regulators and other 
monitors underscores the fact that regulatory monitors do not behave the same as other monitors. 
One key reason for this is that regulatory monitors have more binding resource constraints; they 
26 
 
are tasked with monitoring all firms and must choose how to most efficiently allocate their 
resources to monitor as many firms as possible. Other monitors, on the other hand, also face 
resource constraints, but can choose any subset of firms to monitor and will only choose to 
monitor firms when doing so is profitable. 
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CHAPTER 5: VALIDATING THE TSTR MECHANISM 
I rely on assumptions from the Basu and Dixit (2014) model and the prior empirical 
literature on regulatory monitoring and spillover to generate my hypotheses and interpret my 
results. In this section I conduct a series of analyses which show predictable variation in the 
strength of the TSTR effect in order to validate these assumptions and the mechanisms that are 
driving my results. By documenting meaningful industry, country, and time variation in the 
TSTR phenomenon, I am able to further support the interpretation of my main results. 
Specifically I show that the effects of being in a TSTR industry vary predictably around 
exogenous changes in monitoring (SOX 408), enforcement (insider trading laws), and resource 
constraints (recessions) and also with the importance of regulation to the industry. 
SOX Section 408 
 Table 3 shows that firms in TSTR industries are subject to less monitoring by the SEC 
and IRS. Basu and Dixit (2014) and the literature on regulatory spillovers would suggest that this 
occurs because these industries are disproportionately costly to monitor and subject to fewer 
regulatory spillovers; however, it is possible that some other unobserved factor could be driving 
this relation. To further validate my interpretation of these results, I show that the effect of TSTR 
on SEC monitoring varies predictably with an exogenous shock to how the SEC allocates 
monitoring resources between firms of different sizes: Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 408. 
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SOX Section 408 requires the SEC to review every firm at least once every 3 years.
28
 
Prior to SOX 408, the SEC was free to choose which firms to review, with some firms 
potentially going many years without being monitored. As a result, the SOX 408 mandate to 
periodically review all firms had a disproportionate effect on the monitoring of firms which had 
previously been overlooked, specifically small firms. Disproportionate increases in the 
monitoring of small firms should in turn lead to disproportionate increases in the regulatory 
spillover they generate. This implies that increases in regulatory spillovers should be especially 
pronounced in industries composed of small firms, or TSTR industries, leading to particularly 
large increases in the monitoring of these firms. As a result, I predict that SOX Section 408 
decreased the TSTR effect on SEC monitoring, or, stated conversely, that firms in TSTR 
industries experienced disproportionately large increases in SEC monitoring around SOX 408. If 
regulatory spillovers exist, then I should find that increases in monitoring are particularly 
pronounced in TSTR industries, even when controlling for increases in monitoring that 
individual firms experienced under SOX 408 as a result of their own size. 
In Table 7 Panel A, I control for the effect of SOX 408 based on a firm’s own size 
(SOX408 x lnMVE) and demonstrate that the TSTR effect is considerably weaker in the post-
SOX 408 period (TSTR x SOX408 is significantly positive) consistent with the presence of 
industry spillovers amplifying the effect of monitoring small firms in TSTR industries around 
SOX 408. These results confirm the mechanism in H1 by validating that a lack of regulatory 
monitoring for firms in TSTR industries is driven to some extent by a lack of regulatory spillover 
from small peers. Additionally, they provide novel evidence on the effects of SOX 408 by 
showing a fundamental shift in how SEC monitoring was conducted after the Section was 
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internal controls, it applies to all firms, regardless of size, and was effective for all firms at the same time. 
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implemented, as well as evidence that this requirement appears to have mitigated one type of 
regulatory shortcoming. However, I do not examine the net benefit of this shift in monitoring and 
cannot speak to the optimality of the SEC’s behavior before or after SOX 408. 
Insider Trading Law Enforcement  
 In my analyses I use liquidity as an indirect measure of regulatory compliance because 
non-compliance on the part of the firm will increase uncertainty and information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed investors thereby increasing illiquidity. One reason this is the 
case is that informed insiders have knowledge of a firm’s non-compliant activities, leading to 
information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. In other words, insider 
trading is one channel through which non-compliant activities affect market liquidity. To provide 
evidence that this is the case, I use staggered enforcement of insider trading laws across the 
countries in my sample to show that the effect of being in a TSTR industry on liquidity is lower 
when insider trading is curbed. As demonstrated in Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) and 
Bushman et al. (2005), countries which passed insider trading laws did not experience benefits of 
these laws until after the laws had been enforced. I therefore use the dates of initial insider 
trading law enforcement to identify decreases in the amount of insider trading in a country that 
are relatively exogenous with respect to individual firms and industries.
29
 If insider trading is one 
of the mechanisms by which firms in TSTR industries experience lower liquidity, then I expect 
that decreased insider trading after enforcement of these laws will mitigate the liquidity effects of 
being in a TSTR industry. The results of my analysis, reported in Table 7 Panel B, are consistent 
with my prediction and show that the effect of TSTR is mitigated for two of my three liquidity 
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dates from Griffin et al. (2011) which provides data as of 2008. As a result, this test only uses data from 2008 and 
earlier and includes only those countries which have enforced insider trading laws by that date, although results are 
consistent if the sample is extended to additional years and countries. 
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measures after the enforcement of insider trading laws. I have no prediction for how insider 
trading law enforcement would affect tax avoidance and do not find a significant relation. 
Overall, these results are consistent with insider trading being one of the mechanisms by which 
non-compliance of firms in TSTR industries affects firm liquidity. 
Regulatory Resource Constraints and Recessions 
 One of the critical conditions for the Too Small to Regulate phenomenon to occur is that 
regulatory resources be constrained so that regulators cannot perfectly monitor all firms. As a 
natural extension, increases in regulatory constraints should exacerbate this monitoring problem. 
To demonstrate that this is the case, I classify periods when regulators are particularly resource-
constrained by identifying years in which countries are in recession (defined as years when per-
capita GDP growth is negative) and predict that the effect of being in a TSTR industry on 
liquidity and tax avoidance is amplified during these periods.
30
 During recessionary periods, 
regulators are more likely to experience exogenous decreases in the budgets allocated to them 
while potentially facing a greater workload; regulators are more likely to engage in regulatory 
interventions during recessions (Zingales, 2009), and financial pressures lead a greater 
proportion of firms to cut corners and violate regulations thus increasing the number of 
violations regulatory monitors need to investigate and resolve (Beneish et al., 2012; Rosner, 
2003; Simpson, 1987). Consistent with my prediction, Table 7 Panel C shows that tax avoidance 
and illiquidity of firms in TSTR industries are especially high during recessionary periods. 
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when identifying recessions using the bottom quartile or decile of country-level growth values. 
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Overall, these results suggest that the effects of being in a TSTR industry tend to be amplified 
when regulators are particularly resource-constrained.
31
 
Industry-Specific Importance of Regulation 
 Lastly, while I rule out industry as an explanation for my results by including industry 
and firm fixed effects in my specifications, it is possible that the Too Small to Regulate effect 
may vary systematically across industries. I examine this possibility in Table 7 Panel D by 
measuring the importance of regulation to an industry and showing that when regulation is more 
important the liquidity consequences of being in a TSTR industry are significantly stronger. 
 Certain industries face higher levels of regulation because lawmakers believe that 
regulatory interventions are particularly important to mitigate externalities and market failures in 
these industries. For example, healthcare-related industries such as hospitals or pharmaceutical 
companies tend to face relatively high levels of regulation because failures in these markets are 
perceived to be particularly costly. Similarly, the recent financial crisis has shown that problems 
in financial industries can lead to negative consequences for the economy as a whole. On the 
other hand, industries related to consumer goods such as clothing or furnishings have historically 
been subject to less industry-specific regulation because the costs of failures in these markets are 
perceived to be smaller. Consequently, I predict that the liquidity effects of non-compliance in 
TSTR industries will be pronounced when regulation is more important because non-compliance 
in these industries should lead to greater uncertainty and information asymmetry of market 
participants. 
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 One potential concern is that these results are driven by firms in TSTR industries experiencing exacerbated effects 
of the recession itself. However, the main effect of the Recession variable and its interaction with TSTR rarely 
exhibit the same sign; as a result, firms in TSTR industries do not appear to experience exacerbated effects of 
recessions themselves (i.e., TSTR industries don’t tend to be particularly procyclical) but instead appear to respond 
differentially to recessions in a way that is consistent with differences in regulatory monitoring and compliance. 
Further, to rule out the possibility a firm’s own size drives these results, untabulated analyses control for the 
interaction Recession x lnMVE and obtain similar results. 
32 
 
 In Table 7 Panel D, I interact TSTR with the importance of regulation to an industry, 
Reg_Importance, which is constructed using an index of industry regulation from Al-Ubaydli 
and McLaughlin (2015) which measures the amount of industry-specific regulation for each 
industry in the U.S. in any given year. I assume that regulation is more important in industries 
with more industry-specific regulation because in equilibrium lawmakers will impose more 
regulations on industries where the benefits are greatest. Additionally, while the importance of 
regulation may vary across countries because of political, economic, cultural, and geographic 
factors, most aspects should remain constant. This reasoning is consistent with Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) who use U.S. data to infer industry dependence on external financing 
internationally. Further, I find reasonable variation in Reg_Importance; industries related to 
healthcare, oil and gas, and financial services have high values of Reg_Importance while 
industries related to consumer goods and industrial products have low values. 
 Consistent with my prediction, in Table 7 Panel D I find that the liquidity effects of being 
in a TSTR industry are pronounced for firms that are in industries where regulation is more 
important, suggesting that the effects of being in a TSTR industry are amplified when the 
consequences of regulatory non-compliance are greatest.
32
 By documenting a predictable link 
between the magnitude of the TSTR effect on liquidity and the importance of regulation, I 
further support my interpretation that a TSTR industry configuration affects liquidity through 
effects on regulatory monitoring and compliance. It would be unlikely that the TSTR relation 
with liquidity would vary predictably with the importance of regulation if this relation were 
driven by factors completely unrelated to regulation. 
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 I have no prediction for the effect of the importance of regulation on tax compliance because tax avoidance and its 
consequences are unlikely to vary based on costs of other types of industry-specific non-compliance. 
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Additional Analysis and Robustness 
While the results presented in Table 7 further confirm my interpretation of my main 
analyses, a variety of factors could potentially confound the observed relation between TSTR 
industry configuration and regulatory compliance and monitoring. For example, if the prevalence 
of small firms in TSTR industries is a sign that they have less developed stock markets then my 
empirical measure of TSTR could be capturing changes in stock market development that are not 
controlled for by my firm, country, industry, and year fixed effects. Because industries in 
countries with well-developed stock markets are unlikely to experience changes to their stock 
market development, the results of Table 3 which examines the effect of TSTR on monitoring by 
the SEC within the well-developed market of the U.S. are unlikely to be driven by changes in 
stock market development. In addition, Table 8 presents the main results from Tables 2 and 4 for 
only those countries which have the highest quality regulatory and reporting practices according 
to Table 3, Panel C of Leuz (2010). Results are similar to the main specifications.
33
 
In order to rule out other potential factors, I conduct a battery of robustness tests which 
vary the fixed effect structure in my international analyses. I include country-year, industry-year, 
country-industry, and country-industry-year fixed effects (using 2- and 3-digit ICB codes which 
are broader than the 4-digit ICB codes used to define my TSTR measure), and additionally 
calculate standard errors that are clustered by industry-country, country-year, industry-year, 
country, and industry and continue to find consistent results. 
One further concern could be that firms strategically choose to remain small in order to 
avoid regulatory monitoring. While this has been documented around specific thresholds (Iliev, 
2010), it seems much less likely that firms would limit their long-term growth in order to avoid 
regulation. Further, this seems even less likely to occur at the industry level because it would 
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require groups of firms colluding to remain small, even when individual firms might have 
incentives to deviate and increase their market share. Thus reverse causality seems unlikely to 
drive the results in this paper. Further, the variation in the TSTR result with exogenous shocks to 
regulatory monitoring and enforcement are not consistent with this story. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
In this paper I examine a phenomenon called Too Small to Regulate (TSTR) which 
occurs when an industry is predominantly composed of small firms. Basu and Dixit (2014) 
predict that firms in such industries are more difficult for resource-constrained regulators to deter 
because of limited liability constraints on penalties and fixed costs of monitoring, while 
empirical evidence suggests this monitoring and deterrence problem will be exacerbated at the 
industry-level by regulatory spillovers (Block and Feinstein, 1986; Schenk, 2012). Consistent 
with these predictions, I demonstrate that a firm’s level of regulatory monitoring is lower in 
TSTR industries, using text-based measures of regulatory monitoring for my international 
sample as well as a direct measure of one type of regulatory monitoring for U.S. firms: 
regulatory filing downloads from the EDGAR database by SEC and IRS employees. Firms in 
TSTR industries are more likely to engage in tax avoidance and are penalized by investors 
through lower liquidity; however, these effects are mitigated by the presence of analysts, 
institutional investors, the news media, and Big N auditors. Lastly, I provide evidence that the 
effects of being in a TSTR industry vary predictably with exogenous changes in regulatory 
monitoring (SOX 408), enforcement (insider trading laws), and resource constraints (recessions), 
and is amplified in industries where regulation plays a greater role. 
This paper is important for several reasons. First, it demonstrates a link between industry 
composition and regulatory monitoring and compliance. While there has been some evidence on 
determinants of regulatory monitoring (Johnston and Petacchi, 2015), prior research has not 
studied how industry composition, in particular the size of other firms in the industry, can affect 
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how often firms are monitored by regulators. This finding is of interest to regulators to the extent 
that they wish to ensure that firms under their jurisdiction abide by existing laws and regulations. 
Additionally, to the extent that other firm stakeholders such as investors, consumers, and 
creditors rely on regulatory monitoring to ensure compliance and a level playing field, it will be 
of interest to them as well. While the limited resources of regulators mean that they will 
optimally fail to prevent non-compliance by some firms, especially small ones, my results 
indicate that the Too Small to Regulate problem at the industry-level can be significant; although 
each individual firm may be small, in aggregate this problem can be non-trivial. Lastly, my paper 
is among the first to directly measure regulatory monitoring, in particular by the SEC, and 
provides novel evidence on the determinants of this monitoring. 
I see several avenues for future research. First, while this paper focuses mainly on the 
TSTR effect in financial regulation, further work can examine this phenomenon in the context of 
non-financial regulation, for example emissions standards or health and safety requirements, or 
for other types of financial regulation such as banking. More broadly, future research can 
continue to examine all determinants and outcomes of regulatory monitoring, especially for the 
SEC. While prior research on the SEC has been limited to examining ex post observed 
enforcement outcomes, EDGAR download data provide researchers with the ability to directly 
observe one type of ex ante monitoring activity. A better understanding of the regulatory process 
is key to identifying flaws in the current system (such as TSTR) and empirically documenting 
policy changes that appear to alleviate some of these problems (such as SOX 408).  
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Full Sample
N Mean Median Std P25 P75
TSTR  376,481 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00
ETR  376,481 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.00 0.41
Zero_Ret  351,716 25.96 15.71 26.40 5.60 38.96
Amihud    97,425 0.79 0.01 2.78 0.00 0.25
BidAsk  210,236 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.04
RegWords    95,720 230.06 177.00 186.52 100.00 295.00
RegulatorNames    95,169 3.83 1.00 7.66 0.00 3.00
Analyst  375,141 2.87 1.00 5.02 0.00 3.00
Inst_Own  172,524 6.82 2.74 9.50 0.40 9.50
Media_Covg  129,828 69.10 27.00 105.74 9.00 88.00
BigN  376,481 0.43 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Recession  345,994 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00
Reg_Importance  376,481 0.49 0.33 0.37 0.00 0.67
Med_Age  376,481 10.60 9.69 5.02 6.95 13.43
lnSumMVE  376,481 16.54 16.77 2.22 15.05 18.18
HHI  376,481  2,337.42  1,686.27  1,963.90  899.74  3,145.22 
CRatio  376,481 68.28 68.44 22.89 50.08 89.50
IFRS  376,481 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.00
US_GAAP  376,481 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
ADR  376,481 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00
lnMVE  376,481 11.57 11.47 2.04 10.13 12.92
BM_Ratio  376,481 1.02 0.71 1.27 0.39 1.24
Leverage  376,481 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.04 0.35
ROA  376,481 -0.05 0.02 0.41 -0.01 0.06
Age  376,481 12.18 10.24 8.22 5.65 16.90
Loss  376,481 0.29 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00
EarnSurprise  376,481 0.04 0.01 0.38 -0.03 0.05
U.S.-Only Measures
N Mean Median Std P25 P75
SEC_Total_Views 23348 22.11 9.00 41.56 2.00 22.00
SEC_Unique_Views 23348 12.30 6.00 19.69 2.00 14.00
IRS_Total_Views 23348 3.17 0.00 8.42 0.00 2.00
IRS_Unique_Views 23348 2.00 0.00 5.02 0.00 1.00
Restate 23348 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00
Id_Vol 23348 2.57 1.88 2.20 1.00 3.73
IPO 23348 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00
CF_Vol 23348 0.64 0.09 1.82 0.03 0.35
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Panel A. Summary Statistics
 
 
Country N Proportion Country N Proportion Country N Proportion
Argentina 856       0.08 Hong Kong 10,931  0.02 Philippines 2,121     0.27
Australia 15,361  0.22 Hungary 267       0.07 Poland 1,763     0.08
Austria 1,233    0.04 India 12,824  0.19 Portugal 784        0.09
Belgium 1,772    0.02 Indonesia 3,456    0.23 Romania 557        0.33
Bermuda 318       0.00 Ireland 843       0.07 Russia 849        0.19
Brazil 3,111    0.12 Israel 3,405    0.09 Saudi Arabia 445        0.00
Bulgaria 545       0.78 Italy 3,325    0.00 Singapore 6,079     0.02
Canada 19,162  0.23 Japan 49,533  0.00 South Africa 3,978     0.10
Chile 2,233    0.03 Jordan 953       0.14 Spain 2,078     0.01
China 13,848  0.01 South Korea 13,259  0.01 Sri Lanka 886        0.60
Colombia 336       0.03 Kuwait 829       0.00 Sweden 3,803     0.05
Croatia 368       0.02 Luxembourg 354       0.02 Switzerland 3,133     0.01
Cyprus 384       0.53 Malaysia 10,439  0.10 Taiwan 12,601   0.00
Czech Republic 221       0.03 Mexico 1,700    0.03 Thailand 5,466     0.19
Denmark 2,315    0.08 Netherlands 3,004    0.02 Turkey 2,767     0.10
Egypt 588       0.01 New Zealand 1,028    0.07 United Arab Emirates 352        0.00
Finland 1,401    0.02 Norway 1,933    0.01 United Kingdom 25,424   0.08
France 11,124  0.02 Oman 451       0.26 United States 93,118   0.02
Germany 10,964  0.03 Pakistan 1,321    0.11 Venezuela 288        0.09
Greece 3,228    0.10 Peru 766       0.21 Overall 376,481 0.06
Panel B. The Proportion of TSTR Firms by Country
3
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Industry N Proportion
Oil & Gas     13,499 0.031
Chemicals     13,518 0.052
Basic Resources (Forestry & Mining)     26,479 0.237
Construction & Materials     20,324 0.023
Industrial Goods & Services     67,397 0.038
Automobiles & Parts       7,792 0.041
Food & Beverage     18,741 0.053
Personal & Household Goods     27,082 0.108
Health Care     22,321 0.020
Retail     17,945 0.013
Media     10,284 0.036
Travel & Leisure     13,566 0.047
Telecommunications       4,225 0.021
Utilities       7,935 0.012
Banks     21,980 0.003
Insurance       5,310 0.039
Real Estate     18,688 0.040
Financial Services     22,503 0.196
Technology     36,892 0.041
Overall   376,481 0.062
Panel C. The Proportion of TSTR Firms by 2-Digit ICB Industry
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES RegWords RegulatorNames RegWords RegulatorNames
TSTR -2.7800** -0.1490* -3.1720*** -0.5070***
(-2.496) (-1.849) (-3.207) (-6.734)
Num_Words 0.0083*** 0.0003*** 0.0082*** 0.0001**
(12.280) (6.124) (10.740) (1.967)
MedAge -0.0007 0.0526*** -0.156 0.0113
(-0.006) (7.533) (-0.912) (0.956)
lnSumMVE -0.598* -0.109*** -5.099*** -0.419***
(-1.790) (-4.814) (-8.695) (-9.660)
HHI 0.0002 -2.29e-05 8.91e-05 -5.14e-05*
(0.436) (-1.106) (0.223) (-1.898)
Cratio -0.0823** 0.0083*** 0.184*** 0.0196***
(-2.307) (3.601) (3.707) (5.350)
IFRS -10.84*** -2.578*** -12.41*** -2.616***
(-8.938) (-33.100) (-9.242) (-26.910)
US_GAAP 20.12*** 3.509*** -11.52** 0.925**
(4.231) (9.155) (-2.043) (2.060)
ADR 17.97** 2.034*** 12.59 1.549
(2.409) (4.828) (0.615) (1.573)
BigN -1.581* -0.182*** -1.204 -0.411***
(-1.749) (-2.959) (-1.164) (-5.188)
lnMVE -7.665*** -0.287*** -2.976*** -0.0729*
(-24.730) (-13.150) (-6.627) (-1.916)
BM_Ratio -1.887*** -0.0792*** -1.115*** -0.0105
(-5.644) (-3.517) (-3.242) (-0.410)
Leverage -17.91*** -0.807*** -1.240 0.362*
(-8.924) (-5.509) (-0.524) (1.835)
ROA 1.297* -0.143** -0.0797 -0.0691
(1.899) (-2.371) (-0.109) (-1.029)
Age -0.347*** -0.0141*** 3.242 1.087**
(-5.456) (-3.156) (0.500) (2.110)
Loss 1.958** 0.313*** 1.484** 0.0951
(2.526) (5.340) (2.081) (1.566)
Earn_Surprise -1.134** -0.0213 -0.763 -0.0188
(-1.993) (-0.499) (-1.577) (-0.457)
NumWords
2
 - NumWords
5
Y Y Y Y
Country, Industry & Year FE Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y
Observations 94,722 94,184 94,738 94,200
Adjusted R-squared 0.856 0.551 0.934 0.763
Table 2. Effect of TSTR on Text-Based Regulatory Monitoring Measures
Robust t-statistics, clustered by firm, in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES SEC_TotalViews SEC_UniqueViews SEC_TotalViews SEC_UniqueViews
TSTR -12.290*** -7.432*** -6.414 -6.341**
(-2.774) (-3.500) (-1.333) (-2.234)
Restate 8.947*** 4.209*** 6.179*** 2.768***
(9.634) (11.020) (4.969) (5.239)
lag_Restate 5.231*** 2.177*** 3.149** 1.063**
(5.652) (6.964) (2.511) (2.289)
Id_Vol 0.469*** 0.0240 0.489** 0.190*
(2.593) (0.380) (2.242) (1.896)
IPO 1.672 0.409 3.454 2.310**
(1.572) (1.171) (1.314) (2.205)
CF_Vol 2.903*** 0.583*** 3.017*** -0.860*
(6.022) (4.271) (3.046) (-1.867)
Med_Age 7.671*** 5.252*** 3.640 1.240
(2.952) (3.937) (1.298) (0.864)
lnSumMVE -1.985* -0.708 -0.446 -0.212
(-1.780) (-1.379) (-0.624) (-0.578)
HHI 0.001 0.0007* 0.0005 0.0005
(1.478) (1.863) (0.729) (1.203)
Cratio -0.131* -0.100*** -0.0673 -0.0525
(-1.855) (-2.985) (-0.947) (-1.480)
BigN -3.996*** -2.019*** -7.630*** -6.300***
(-5.712) (-7.402) (-5.025) (-6.851)
lnMVE 4.861*** 2.434*** 3.224*** 1.619***
(13.590) (20.610) (4.101) (4.010)
BM_Ratio -2.683*** -1.287*** -1.520 -1.078
(-4.083) (-3.724) (-1.349) (-1.488)
Leverage 1.695 1.656*** 3.385 1.684**
(1.575) (4.250) (1.543) (2.309)
ROA -2.268*** -1.383*** 0.844 0.0512
(-2.974) (-4.139) (0.554) (0.107)
Age 3.608*** 1.795*** 35.44*** 35.72***
(5.985) (7.763) (6.001) (11.350)
Loss 3.430*** 2.048*** 1.925** 1.086**
(4.849) (7.721) (1.981) (2.543)
Earn_Surprise -1.469* -0.774** -1.988* -1.083**
(-1.700) (-2.059) (-1.888) (-2.312)
Industry & Year FE Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y
Observations 23,348 23,348 23,348 23,348
Adjusted R-squared 0.210 0.331 0.322 0.360
Panel A. Effect of TSTR on SEC Monitoring
Table 3. Effect of TSTR on EDGAR Regulatory Monitoring Measures
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES IRS_TotalViews IRS_UniqueViews IRS_TotalViews IRS_UniqueViews
TSTR -0.573 -0.725** -1.175** -1.014**
(-0.956) (-2.204) (-1.963) (-2.570)
Restate 0.181 0.182* 0.0662 0.0905
(1.044) (1.715) (0.285) (0.635)
lag_Restate 0.511*** 0.430*** 0.513** 0.414***
(2.749) (3.676) (2.150) (2.761)
Id_Vol 0.221*** 0.122*** -0.0111 0.0068
(7.150) (6.890) (-0.316) (0.310)
IPO -0.432** -0.315*** -0.569 -0.361
(-2.150) (-2.640) (-1.077) (-1.183)
CF_Vol 0.820*** 0.428*** 1.519*** 0.841***
(7.531) (6.976) (4.876) (4.753)
Med_Age 0.441 0.305 0.391 0.333
(0.759) (0.875) (0.654) (0.951)
lnSumMVE -0.141 -0.0769 0.0882 0.0470
(-0.658) (-0.612) (0.592) (0.530)
HHI 0.0002 6.63e-05 3.72e-05 -1.04e-05
(1.377) (0.909) (0.295) (-0.137)
Cratio 0.0007 0.00547 0.00377 0.0095
(0.0466) (0.585) (0.242) (1.010)
BigN -0.107 -0.0665 0.391 0.242
(-0.866) (-0.905) (1.442) (1.455)
lnMVE 1.127*** 0.668*** 0.306** 0.248***
(14.86) (15.86) (1.979) (2.835)
BM_Ratio -0.105 -0.0229 -0.119 0.0285
(-0.817) (-0.334) (-0.685) (0.308)
Leverage 0.124 0.105 0.284 0.0788
(0.614) (0.877) (0.779) (0.353)
ROA -0.221 -0.0927 -0.560* -0.319*
(-1.361) (-1.027) (-1.833) (-1.925)
Age 1.264*** 0.697*** -5.753*** -2.552***
(9.225) (8.992) (-4.433) (-3.341)
Loss 0.316** 0.235*** 0.474** 0.320**
(2.079) (2.588) (2.100) (2.326)
Earn_Surprise 0.157 0.101 0.299 0.199
(0.947) (1.029) (1.307) (1.451)
Industry & Year FE Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y
Observations 23,285 23,285 23,285 23,285
Adjusted R-squared 0.205 0.185 0.344 0.302
Panel B. Effect of TSTR on IRS Monitoring
Robust t-statistics, clustered by firm, in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ETR Zero_Ret Amihud ln_Bidask
TSTR -0.0223*** 3.2480*** 1.2290*** 0.0170***
(-7.405) (10.930) (14.170) (14.730)
MedAge 0.0013*** 0.137*** 0.0092** -8.74e-05
(7.532) (7.260) (2.503) (-1.416)
lnSumMVE -0.0052*** -0.396*** -0.0260** -6.47e-06
(-8.558) (-6.352) (-2.221) (-0.0328)
HHI 2.26e-06*** 0.0002*** -9.46e-06 8.81e-07***
(3.731) (2.634) (-0.785) (3.866)
Cratio -0.0002*** 0.0108* -0.0015 -2.35e-05
(-3.560) (1.698) (-1.223) (-1.038)
IFRS -0.0138*** -1.792*** 0.113*** -0.0004
(-5.795) (-7.438) (3.570) (-0.500)
US_GAAP -0.0139** -2.678*** 0.123* 0.0091***
(-1.975) (-4.272) (1.705) (4.185)
ADR -0.0101 -3.965*** 0.445*** 0.0070***
(-1.414) (-3.937) (4.261) (2.889)
BigN 0.0182*** -2.860*** -0.153*** -0.0084***
(11.090) (-17.860) (-5.395) (-15.940)
lnMVE 0.0147*** -7.003*** -0.403*** -0.0145***
(32.850) (-147.700) (-38.860) (-77.280)
BM_Ratio 0.0089*** -1.384*** -0.0867*** -0.0041***
(15.660) (-23.360) (-6.307) (-17.950)
Leverage 0.0299*** -1.258*** 0.369*** 0.0048***
(8.630) (-3.795) (4.125) (3.673)
ROA 0.0600*** -1.681*** -0.392*** -0.0165***
(31.690) (-13.020) (-7.480) (-23.130)
Age 0.0003*** 0.0188* 0.0122*** 0.0001***
(3.085) (1.879) (9.237) (4.606)
Loss 0.190*** 0.527*** 0.169*** 0.0057***
(79.800) (4.164) (5.751) (12.270)
Earn_Surprise -0.0386*** 0.0787 0.216*** 0.0049***
(-22.690) (0.853) (6.303) (11.170)
Country, Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 376,481 351,716 97,425 210,236
Adjusted R-squared 0.173 0.504 0.266 0.338
Table 4. The Effect of TSTR on Tax Avoidance and Liquidity
Panel A. Country, Industry, and Year Fixed Effects
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ETR Zero_Ret Amihud ln_Bidask
TSTR -0.0104*** 2.9130*** 0.8550*** 0.0131***
(-3.084) (12.910) (9.297) (14.150)
MedAge 0.0002 -0.0935*** -0.0125*** -0.0005***
(0.691) (-4.239) (-2.802) (-7.727)
lnSumMVE 0.0018 -1.157*** -0.179*** -0.0038***
(1.601) (-14.960) (-9.497) (-16.170)
HHI 6.72e-07 7.25e-05 1.46e-05 1.60e-07
(0.788) (1.185) (1.064) (0.834)
Cratio -0.0005*** -0.0017 0.0046*** 0.0001***
(-5.250) (-0.258) (2.939) (5.563)
IFRS -0.0132*** -0.311 -0.0503 -0.0019***
(-4.480) (-1.431) (-1.507) (-3.175)
US_GAAP 0.0168 -1.058** 0.0625 -0.0029
(1.347) (-1.970) (0.878) (-1.511)
ADR 0.0498*** -0.403 0.0187 -0.0038
(3.044) (-0.238) (0.0654) (-1.261)
BigN -0.0028 -0.567*** -0.0274 -0.0023***
(-1.198) (-4.115) (-0.912) (-5.706)
lnMVE 0.0129*** -4.183*** -0.252*** -0.0078***
(12.500) (-62.750) (-15.970) (-27.320)
BM_Ratio 0.0054*** -1.167*** -0.0942*** -0.0028***
(6.595) (-21.880) (-6.193) (-13.620)
Leverage 0.0329*** 1.146*** 0.293*** 0.0082***
(6.625) (3.549) (3.164) (5.306)
ROA 0.0008 -1.524*** -0.326*** -0.0088***
(0.353) (-12.340) (-6.444) (-10.750)
Age -0.0008 -1.515*** -0.203 -0.0011
(-0.104) (-3.120) (-0.937) (-0.568)
Loss 0.223*** 1.651*** 0.199*** 0.0048***
(79.090) (18.360) (7.575) (13.300)
Earn_Surprise -0.0258*** 1.034*** 0.246*** 0.0051***
(-14.090) (12.530) (8.054) (13.440)
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 376,776 351,918 97,425 210,288
Adjusted R-squared 0.336 0.817 0.627 0.774
Panel B. Firm and Year Fixed Effects
Robust t-statistics, clustered by firm, in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES ETR Zero_Ret Amihud ln_Bidask ETR Zero_Ret Amihud ln_Bidask
TSTR -0.1230*** 13.7200*** 8.2570*** 0.1220*** -0.0463*** 11.0300*** 4.7210*** 0.0488***
(-8.654) (10.430) (18.520) (19.150) (-2.657) (10.090) (10.820) (9.470)
lnMVE 0.0141*** -6.9480*** -0.3630*** -0.0138*** 0.0127*** -4.1270*** -0.2190*** -0.0075***
(31.360) (-144.100) (-36.240) (-73.930) (12.180) (-61.330) (-14.020) (-26.270)
TSTR x lnMVE 0.0103*** -1.0720*** -0.6830*** -0.0109*** 0.0036** -0.8160*** -0.3750*** -0.0037***
(7.449) (-8.356) (-17.550) (-17.800) (2.147) (-7.942) (-10.240) (-7.707)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country, Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 376,481 351,716 97,425 210,236 376,776 351,918 97,425 210,288
Adjusted R-squared 0.173 0.504 0.277 0.343 0.336 0.817 0.629 0.774
Panel A. Variation with Firm Size
Table 5. Variation in the Strength of the TSTR Effect
TSTR -0.0462*** 4.7880*** 1.9250*** 0.0276*** -0.0349*** 3.6830*** 1.1700*** 0.0169***
(-6.035) (7.763) -13.55 (9.776) (-3.634) (6.542) (7.282) (6.420)
RegWords 2.45e-05*** -0.0072*** -0.0001* -6.70e-06*** 6.19e-06 -0.0028*** -0.0002*** -6.10e-06***
(2.935) (-12.7008) (-1.903) (-3.196) (0.532) (-5.961) (-3.240) (-3.975)
TSTR x RegWords 0.0002*** -0.0106*** -0.0040*** -5.14e-05*** 0.0001*** -0.0034 -0.0020*** -1.19e-05
(4.898) (-4.264) (-7.924) (-4.756) (3.300) (-1.590) (-3.846) (-1.250)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country, Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 95,720 91,673 77,972 61,639 95,736 91,689 77,972 61,642
Adjusted R-squared 0.129 0.585 0.270 0.369 0.313 0.848 0.616 0.780
Panel B.Variation with Regulatory Monitoring
Robust t-statistics, clustered by firm, in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES ETR Zero_Ret Amihud ln_Bidask ETR Zero_Ret Amihud ln_Bidask
TSTR -0.0280*** 4.2600*** 1.4550*** 0.0190*** -0.0112*** 3.6420*** 1.0320*** 0.0151***
(-8.623) (13.390) (15.130) (15.400) (-3.050) (14.990) (9.938) (14.930)
Analyst -0.0011*** -0.1810*** 0.0566*** 0.0011*** -0.0006** -0.3630*** 0.0118*** -0.0001***
(-7.204) (-9.999) (19.570) (19.010) (-2.393) (-23.340) (6.726) (-3.837)
TSTR x Analyst 0.0065*** -0.9210*** -0.2160*** -0.0038*** 0.0007 -0.6320*** -0.1390*** -0.0022***
(7.116) (-11.280) (-12.240) (-13.870) (0.770) (-11.770) (-10.050) (-11.740)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country, Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 375,141 350,531 97,015 209,571 375,436 350,733 97,015 209,623
Adjusted R-squared 0.173 0.505 0.275 0.343 0.335 0.818 0.627 0.774
Table 6. Substitutes for Regulatory Monitoring
Panel A. Analyst Following
TSTR -0.0336*** 3.4380*** 0.8870*** 0.0147*** -0.0133** 2.7070*** 0.7450*** 0.0116***
(-6.495) (7.461) (8.082) (9.676) (-2.226) (7.095) (6.844) (9.300)
Inst_Own 0.0003*** -0.0530*** 0.0027*** -4.81e-05*** -0.0002** -0.0517*** 0.0005 -9.03e-05***
(4.877) (-9.590) (6.022) (-2.738) (-2.012) (-8.376) (0.647) (-5.675)
TSTR x Inst_Own 0.0010*** -0.0584** -0.0235*** -0.0004*** 6.06e-05 -0.0688*** -0.0187*** -0.0004***
(3.068) (-2.055) (-5.093) (-3.018) (0.128) (-2.773) (-3.659) (-5.214)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country, Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 196,639 189,248 57,461 129,379 198,776 191,342 58,597 131,090
Adjusted R-squared 0.218 0.495 0.188 0.259 0.356 0.801 0.561 0.785
Panel B. Institutional Ownership
4
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES ETR Zero_Ret Amihud ln_Bidask ETR Zero_Ret Amihud ln_Bidask
TSTR -0.0467*** 3.6440*** 0.9880*** 0.0173*** -0.0101 2.4320*** 0.7950*** 0.0132***
(-6.440) (6.683) (9.118) (8.624) (-1.121) (5.788) (6.587) (8.019)
Media_Covg 1.85e-05 0.0117*** 0.0012*** 3.19e-05*** -3.16e-05* -0.0050*** 9.71e-05** -1.25e-05***
(1.444) (13.160) (16.250) (6.767) (-1.647) (-7.720) (2.205) (-6.443)
TSTR x Media_Covg 0.0003*** -0.0337*** -0.0059*** -0.0001*** 7.32e-05 -0.0195*** -0.0043*** -7.26e-05***
(4.701) (-5.366) (-5.995) (-5.949) (0.592) (-4.769) (-5.424) (-5.895)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country, Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 129,828 126,900 58,053 83,577 129,834 126,906 58,053 83,578
Adjusted R-squared 0.163 0.497 0.192 0.349 0.329 0.829 0.624 0.823
Panel C. Media Coverage
TSTR -0.0262*** 3.3770*** 1.5400*** 0.0205*** -0.0082** 3.4030*** 0.9610*** 0.0150***
(-7.375) (9.920) (13.540) (14.880) (-2.020) (12.680) (8.269) (13.360)
Big N 0.0174*** -2.833*0** -0.1030*** -0.0075*** -0.0023 -0.4820*** -0.0135 -0.0019***
(10.440) (-17.470) (-3.698) (-14.55) (-1.022) (-3.489) (-0.454) (-4.888)
TSTR x Big N 0.0125** -0.4410 -0.8200*** -0.0129*** -0.0069 -1.5360*** -0.2790* -0.0064***
(2.202) (-0.859) (-5.471) (-5.913) (-1.053) (-3.703) (-1.691) (-3.843)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country, Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 376,481 351,716 97,425 210,236 376,776 351,918 97,425 210,288
Adjusted R-squared 0.173 0.504 0.267 0.339 0.336 0.817 0.627 0.774
Panel D. Big N Auditor
Robust t-statistics, clustered by firm, in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES SEC_TotalViews SEC_UniqueViews SEC_TotalViews SEC_UniqueViews
TSTR -24.93*** -15.26*** -20.71*** -15.90***
(-3.336) (-3.717) (-2.664) (-3.017)
SOX408 28.80*** 29.33*** 31.21*** 31.40***
(10.630) (18.060) (8.909) (15.120)
lnMVE 9.491*** 6.682*** 8.255*** 6.117***
(21.71) (26.04) (9.307) (12.59)
SOX408 x lnMVE -6.455*** -5.931*** -6.736*** -5.988***
(-15.45) (-23.60) (-12.85) (-19.44)
TSTR x SOX408 21.22*** 12.63*** 25.69*** 16.93**
(2.776) (2.660) (2.756) (2.520)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Industry & Year FE Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y
Observations 23,348 23,348 23,348 23,348
Adjusted R-squared 0.227 0.391 0.341 0.427
Panel A. The Effect of SOX 408 on SEC Monitoring of TSTR Firms
Table 7. Cross-Sectional Tests of Mechanisms Driving the TSTR Phenomenon
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES ETR Zero_Ret Amihud ln_Bidask ETR Zero_Ret Amihud ln_Bidask
TSTR -0.0159 6.4890*** 2.5190* 0.0233*** -0.0065 4.7550*** 3.1910** 0.0212***
(-1.293) (4.824) (1.715) (4.217) (-0.470) (4.619) (2.098) (4.566)
IT_Law_Enforce 0.0291*** 2.5340*** 1.5840*** -0.0070*** 0.0207*** 2.9150*** 0.7280*** -0.0070***
(6.354) (5.111) (5.693) (-3.482) (4.068) (6.662) (2.766) (-4.410)
TSTR x IT_Law_Enforce -0.0031 -4.1650*** -1.3210 -0.0092* -0.0032 -3.0110*** -2.5080 -0.0113**
(-0.244) (-3.081) (-0.899) (-1.664) (-0.224) (-2.969) (-1.645) (-2.431)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country, Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 291,874 269,112 72,300 140,959 292,150 269,309 72,300 141,011
Adjusted R-squared 0.171 0.511 0.282 0.343 0.345 0.822 0.665 0.787
Panel B. Insider Trading Law Enforcement
TSTR -0.0199*** 2.1220*** 1.1590*** 0.0128*** -0.0105*** 2.6570*** 0.7460*** 0.0115***
(-6.126) (6.666) (13.540) (10.160) (-2.890) (10.970) (8.106) (11.350)
Recession 0.0024 1.6940*** -0.3680*** -0.0006 0.0053** 1.2260*** -0.3770*** -0.0018***
(1.247) (14.270) (-10.390) (-1.283) (2.568) (12.380) (-11.010) (-4.517)
TSTR x Recession -0.0123** 4.7570*** 0.3480 0.0250*** 0.00331 2.6020*** 0.6380*** 0.0206***
(-2.052) (10.280) (1.487) (11.170) (0.518) (6.955) (2.802) (11.430)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country, Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 345,994 321,500 96,835 190,503 346,275 321,688 96,835 190,541
Adjusted R-squared 0.169 0.511 0.267 0.336 0.335 0.820 0.628 0.779
Panel C. Recessions
4
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES ETR Zero_Ret Amihud ln_Bidask ETR Zero_Ret Amihud ln_Bidask
TSTR -0.0298*** 1.4030*** 1.0260*** 0.0083*** -0.0139*** 0.6260* 0.5770*** 0.0045***
(-6.429) (2.895) (6.452) (4.318) (-2.662) (1.665) (3.601) (3.153)
Reg_Importance 0.0044 1.4240*** -0.2000*** -0.0005 0.0120** 1.7300*** -0.1700** 0.0018*
(0.928) (4.366) (-2.663) (-0.379) (2.316) (6.118) (-2.432) (1.789)
TSTR x Reg_Importance 0.0157* 3.8070*** 0.3870 0.0174*** 0.0079 5.2260*** 0.5650** 0.0186***
(1.923) (4.540) (1.489) (5.218) (0.839) (7.845) (1.995) (6.662)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country, Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 376,481 351,716 97,425 210,236 376,776 351,918 97,425 210,288
Adjusted R-squared 0.173 0.504 0.266 0.339 0.336 0.817 0.627 0.774
Panel D. The Importance of Regulation to the Industry
Robust t-statistics, clustered by firm, in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES RegWords RegulatorNames RegWords RegulatorNames
TSTR -6.130*** -0.081 -5.334*** -0.381***
(-4.678) (-0.882) (-4.534) (-4.786)
Controls Y Y Y Y
NumWords
1
 - NumWords
5
Y Y Y Y
Country, Industry & Year FE Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y
Observations 58,023 57,556 58,035 57,568
Adjusted R-squared 0.866 0.591 0.942 0.787
Table 8. Main Results for Only High Securities Regulation Quality Countries
Panel A. Text-Based Regulatory Monitoring Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ETR Zero_Ret Amihud ln_Bidask
TSTR -0.024*** 2.604*** 0.854*** 0.014***
(-5.739) (7.378) (10.340) (10.200)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Country, Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 189,768 172,778 61,616 85,658
Adjusted R-squared 0.100 0.577 0.246 0.403
Panel B. Tax Avoidance and Liquidity; Country, Industry, and Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ETR Zero_Ret Amihud ln_Bidask
TSTR -0.015*** 2.381*** 0.769*** 0.012***
(-3.168) (8.048) (8.836) (9.215)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 189,954 172,913 61,616 85,679
Adjusted R-squared 0.299 0.825 0.643 0.734
Robust t-statistics, clustered by firm, in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel C. Tax Avoidance and Liquidity; Firm and Year Fixed Effects
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APPENDIX 1: DATABASES 
Thomson One Reuters Datastream Worldscope accounting data and Datastream market 
data relating to fiscal years 1991-2011. 
Bureau van Dijk Osiris database 
 
International annual report data used to compute 
textual measures, spanning fiscal years 1998-2011. 
EDGAR Download Data Obtained from the SEC website. Limited to U.S. 
firms and the calendar years 2004-2008. 
I/B/E/S Analyst Forecast Data Spans the fiscal years 1991 to 2011. 
Ravenpack Ravenpack News Analytics Dow Jones Edition 4.0 
spanning the fiscal years 1999 to 2011. 
Thomson Reuters International Mutual 
Fund (TIMF) database 
Institutional ownership data for non-U.S. firms 
only, spanning 1991 to 2010. 
Thomson Reuters Filing 13-F database Institutional ownership data for U.S. firms only, 
spanning 1991 to 2010. 
Compustat Accounting data for U.S. firms spanning the fiscal 
years 2004 to 2008. 
CRSP Market-based measures for U.S. firms spanning the 
fiscal years 2004 to 2008. 
World Bank national accounts data International GDP data spanning the years 1991-
2011 
Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin RegData 
database 
Yearly data on the amount of regulation faced by 
U.S. industries spanning the years 1991-2011. 
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APPENDIX 2: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Unless otherwise noted, variables are defined for use in both the international (Datastream) and 
U.S. (Compustat) samples. Industries are identified at the 4-digit ICB level for the Datastream 
data and at the 3-digit SIC level for the Compustat data. Continuous variables are truncated at the 
1% and 99% levels. 
 
Main Independent Variables of Interest  
TSTR Indicator variable coded 1 if the size of the 
median firm in the country-industry-year is in 
the lowest size quintile for that year (across 
all countries). 
  
Main Dependent Variables of Interest  
Amihud 
 
  
Amihud price impact of trade measure. 
Calculated as 100 times the average ratio over 
the fiscal year of the ratio of daily absolute 
returns to the total daily trading volume in 
U.S. dollars. 
ETR A firm’s effective tax rate, calculated as tax 
expense divided by income before taxes and 
extraordinary items. 
IRS_TotalViews The total number of a firm’s documents 
downloaded by IP addresses affiliated with 
the IRS during the current fiscal year. U.S. 
firms only. 
IRS_UniqueViews The total number of a firm’s documents 
downloaded for the first time by IP addresses 
affiliated with the IRS during the current 
fiscal year. U.S. firms only. 
Ln_Bidask The median bid ask spread over the fiscal 
year, where the bid ask spread is defined as 
(ask–bid)/((ask+bid)/2). I take the natural log 
to reduce skewness. 
RegWords The number of words in the annual report 
related to regulation (details on keywords 
included in Section A3 and the Internet 
Appendix). 
Regulator_Names The number times that a specific securities 
regulator is mention in the annual report 
related to regulation (a list of securities 
regulator names is included in the Internet 
Appendix). 
SEC_TotalViews The total number of a firm’s documents 
downloaded by IP addresses affiliated with 
the SEC during the current fiscal year. U.S. 
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firms only. 
SEC_UniqueViews The total number of a firm’s documents 
downloaded for the first time by IP addresses 
affiliated with the SEC during the current 
fiscal year. U.S. firms only. 
Zero_Ret The percent of the total trading days in the 
year where the firm had a stock return of zero. 
  
Interaction Variables  
Analyst The number of unique analysts issuing 
forecasts for firm i's annual earnings, obtained 
from I/B/E/S. 
BigN An indicator variable coded 1 if the firm has a 
Big-N auditor. 
Inst_Own The percent of the firm’s total common stock 
outstanding that is currently held by 
institutional investors, constructed using data 
from the Thomson Reuters International 
Mutual Fund (TIMF) database for non-U.S. 
firms, and using Thomson Reuters Form 13-F 
data for U.S. firms. 
IT_Law_Enforce Indicator variable coded 1 for country-years 
after the first enforcement of insider trading 
laws in that country using dates from 
Battacharya and Daouk (2002) and Griffin et al. 
(2011). Available until 2008. 
Media_Covg The total number of articles relating to the 
firm (relevance level >= 75) over the current 
fiscal year in the Ravenpack database. 
Recession Indicator variable coded 1 when the country-
year has negative per-capita GDP growth, 
obtained from the World Bank. 
Reg_Importance The importance of regulation to the industry. 
The overall quartile ranking of the yearly 
median Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2015) 
regulation index for all 4-digit ICB codes 
within a 1-digit ICB industry, scaled to range 
between 0 and 1. 
  
Control Variables  
ADR Indicator variable for whether a firm has an 
American Depositary Receipt in the current 
year. 
Age Age of a firm in years, approximated using its 
date of initial coverage in Datastream for non-
U.S. firms, or the first year a firm is covered 
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in Compustat or CRSP for U.S. firms. 
BM_Ratio Book-to-market ratio, using book value of 
common equity divided by market value of 
common equity, both measured at the 
beginning of the year. 
CF_Vol Quarterly cash flow volatility over the last 5 
years. U.S. firms only. 
Earn_Surprise Change in earnings per common share, scaled 
by price of common shares at the beginning 
of the year. 
Id_Vol Relative idiosyncratic stock volatility 
estimated from the market model over the 
current fiscal year. U.S. firms only. 
IFRS An indicator variable coded 1 if the firm uses 
International Financial Reporting Standards. 
IPO Indicator variable for whether the firm had an 
IPO in the last 4 years. U.S. firms only. 
Leverage Total debt (short-term + long-term) divided 
by total assets, measured at the beginning of 
the year. 
lnMVE Natural log of the beginning of year market 
capitalization (thousands in Datastream data, 
millions in U.S. data). 
Loss An indicator variable coded 1 if the firm 
reports a loss. 
Num_Words The total number of words in a firm’s annual 
report. 
Restate Indicator variable for whether the firm issued 
a restatement in the current fiscal year. U.S. 
firms only. 
ROA Return on assets. Net income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
SOX408 An indicator variable coded 1 for fiscal 
periods that end after SOX 408 became 
effective on July 30, 2005. 
US_GAAP An indicator variable coded 1 if the firm uses 
US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles. 
  
Industry-Level Control Variables  
CRatio 4-firm industry concentration ratio, measured 
as the sum of the market share (percent of 
total industry market capitalization) of the 4 
largest firms in the industry. 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Calculated as 
the sum of squared percent market shares 
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(using market capitalization) of all firms in 
the industry. Maximum value is 10,000 for 
single-firm industries. Minimum value is 
close to 0. 
ln_SumMVE Natural log of the sum of the market 
capitalizations of all firms in the country-
industry-year. 
MedAge The median age of firms in the same country-
industry-year. 
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APPENDIX 3: EXAMPLE REGULATION-RELATED KEYWORDS AND PHRASES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
accordance filing mandatory
accounting standards fine monitor
attorney government agency ordinance
audit indict prosecute
authorities infraction punishment
compliance inspection regulatatory agency
compulsory investigation regulation
court jurisdiction requirement
criminal jury rule
defendant law sanction
deter lawyer securities commission
directive legal securities law
enforce legislation statutory
exchange commission listing requirement supervisory
felony litigation violation
A subsample of the words and phrases used to generate RegWords 
(this list does not include variations of each word considered in the
analysis). The full list is available in the Internet Appendix.
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